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In response to Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property 
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007). 
Anything for love. 
I would do anything for love. 
I would do anything for love, 
But I won’t do that. 
I won’t do that.
1
 
When Meat Loaf mystified scores of listeners in the early nineties 
with his logically inconsistent song lyrics, he almost certainly did not 
look to property law when answering his fans’ most popular question.
2
  
This Response does not argue that he should have.  However, Meat 
Loaf’s (in)famous song lyrics may be able to shed light on what has 
become a popular question among property “fans”: namely, what is 
the nature of the right to exclude? 
In this Response, I argue that an owner’s invocation of the right to 
exclude depends upon the owner’s invocation of other rights in the 
property bundle.  In so arguing, I analyze current efforts to under-
stand the right to exclude through the lens of the “property outlaw,” 
whom Eduardo Moisés Peñalver and Sonia K. Katyal profile in their 
recent article, Property Outlaws.
3
  I first highlight the effects of Peñalver 
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MEAT LOAF, I’d Do Anything for Love (But I Won’t Do That), on BAT OUT OF HELL II: 
BACK INTO HELL (Virgin Records 1993). 
2
Meat Loaf has said, “What is ‘that?’” is one of the most popular questions he is 
asked.  See MEAT LOAF: LIVE WITH THE MELBOURNE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA (Warner 
Music Vision 2004). 
3
Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
1095 (2007). 
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and Katyal’s argument on the nature of property law’s right to ex-
clude.  After summarizing recent efforts to understand the right to 
exclude, I describe Peñalver and Katyal’s argument that outlaw behav-
ior has a special and socially productive function in property law,
4
 and 
explain the connection between their article and the right to exclude.  
I conclude this Response by proffering evidence that Meat Loaf may 
have audited a first-year property law course, or at least that he incor-
porated insights about property law into his music. 
I.  THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE:  FAVORITE CHILD, OR ONLY CHILD? 
The right to exclude has long been considered the centerpiece of 
property law.  Since Blackstone defined property as the “sole and des-
potic dominion . . . over the external things of the world, in total ex-
clusion of the right of any other individual in the universe,”
5
 the right 
has remained in the minds of property scholars “the sine qua non” of 
what property is.
6
  Despite Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s and A.M. 
Honoré’s efforts
7
 to bundle it with the rights to use, possess, and trans-
fer property,
8
 the right to exclude has enjoyed an elevated status in re-
lation to its fellow sticks both by the Court
9
 and by its commentators.
10
 
 
4
Id. at 1098 (“[T]he apparent stability and order that property law provides owe 
much to the destabilizing role of the lawbreaker, who occasionally forces shifts of enti-
tlements and laws.”). 
5
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2. 
6
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 
(1998); see also Richard A. Epstein, Rights and “Rights Talk,” 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106, 
1109 (1992) (book review) (“What is wrong with a system of absolute rights that allows 
individuals to exclude some persons on a whim and admit others only by mutual con-
sent?  By and large, nothing.”). 
7
See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 
712-13 (1996) (indicating that the “bundle of rights” slogan derives from a combina-
tion of Hohfeld’s analysis of rights and from Honoré’s description of incidents of own-
ership). 
8
See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 81 (6th ed. 2006) (indicating that the 
bundle of property rights consists of “the right to possess, the right to use, the right to 
exclude, [and] the right to transfer”).  In addition to these four, Lior Strahilevitz has 
argued persuasively that Black’s Law Dictionary, and by extension jurists with an interest 
in unpacking property’s bundle, may have erred when omitting a fifth right, “the right 
to destroy,” from its definition of “owner.”  See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to De-
stroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 790-91 (2005). 
9
See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (characterizing the right as “[t]he hallmark of a protected prop-
erty interest”); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 
(1982) (acknowledging the right as “one of the most treasured strands” of the bundle); 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (calling the right “one of the 
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Recent scholarship has focused on disaggregating the elements of 
the right.
11
  These efforts at disaggregation have complemented efforts 
to determine whether the right is not only the centerpiece, but the 
only piece, of property law.
12
  Of these latter efforts, perhaps the most 
radical has been put forward by Professor Peñalver himself, who has 
argued famously that “theorists have generally overemphasized the 
degree to which private property enables owners to escape from 
communal coercion.”
13
  Instead, Professor Peñalver favors the concep-
tion of property not as exit, but as entrance.  He has argued that 
 
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as prop-
erty”). 
10
See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights To Exclude, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (2006) (noting that the right has been deemed “fore-
most among the property rights”); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, 
JR., PROPERTY LAW:  OWNERSHIP, USE, AND CONSERVATION 53 (2006) (arguing that “the 
cornerstone of private property is the right to exclude anyone and anything from your 
property that you don’t want on your property”). 
11
See, for example, Strahilevitz, supra note 10, at 1837, in which the author fa-
mously unpacked the right to exclude into four component parts: 
(1) The Hermit’s Right (the right to keep everyone off the resource owner’s 
property); (2) The Bouncer’s Right (the right to admit prospective entrants 
selectively to the resource owner’s property); (3) The Exclusionary Vibe (the 
right to convey messages about who is welcome or unwelcome on the prop-
erty, enforced primarily by social and psychological sanctions); and (4) The 
Exclusionary Amenity (the right to embed polarizing and costly club goods on 
the resource owner’s property in order to sort between desirable and undesir-
able entrants). 
See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To Exclude:  Of Property, Inviola-
bility, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2008) (manu-
script at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1016222 (arguing that the right to 
exclude is best understood not so much as a “right,” but as a normative device, analo-
gous to the promise in contract law, in which the right to exclude derives from prop-
erty law’s norm of resource inviolability). 
12
See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 6, at 754 (defining property as “the right to exclude 
others from valuable resources, no more and no less”).  But see Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions 1 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 07-38, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014161 (setting forth a theory of property law that ac-
counts for more than the right to exclude, or any other single right, and instead ac-
counts for “(1) the number of owners, (2) the scope of owner’s dominion and (3) as-
set configuration”); Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1227, 1231, 1280-96 (2006) (defending the argument that property law should develop 
an entitlement scheme to respond to associational collective action problems, such as 
the concentration of poverty in metropolitan areas, and that the absence of such a 
scheme in current property law derives from a dichotomous understanding of property 
law, as either belonging to everyone or no one); Adam Mossoff, What is Property?  Put-
ting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 377 (2003) (understanding the right 
to exclude as an “essential but insufficient” element of the meaning of property law). 
13
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1893 (2005). 
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property law is not an institution that excludes, but is instead “an insti-
tution that binds individuals together into normative communities.”
14
 
II.  THE PRODUCTIVE ROLE OF PROPERTY’S OUTLAW 
Professors Peñalver and Katyal view their article as one that builds 
upon a dialogic conception of property, which they and others have 
developed.
15
  In Property Outlaws, Professors Peñalver and Katyal argue 
that intentional property outlaws—the “little people” and “have-nots” 
who “cannot afford to file civil suits or whose voice in the legislative 
process is too weak to attract the attention of lawmakers and thus un-
able to wrest a change in property relations from existing entitle-
ments”—have “repeatedly played a powerful and visible role as cata-
lysts for needed legal change.”
16
 
The history that Professors Peñalver and Katyal reconstruct, in 
which outlaws have “played a key role in fostering both symbolic and 
substantive evolution within the law of private ownership,”
17
 is persua-
sive because it is both compelling and intuitive.  Professors Peñalver 
and Katyal organize their article by identifying three categories of 
property outlaws that have helped to make property law “a dynamic 
institution that is broadly reflective of evolving community values, as 
opposed to a fixed set of entitlements rooted in abstract moral and 
economic theory.”
18
  Those categories are (a) “acquisitive outlaws,” (b) 
“expressive outlaws,” and (c) “intersectional outlaws.”
19
 
Acquisitive outlaws break property laws in order to acquire a piece 
of property, typically the piece toward which their lawbreaking is di-
rected.
20
  Examples include adverse possessors and those who enter 
land under the doctrine of necessity.  Expressive outlaws, like the 
black students in Greenville, South Carolina, who sat in at segregated 
 
14
Id. at 1972. 
15
See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1101 & n.19 (referring to and citing a 
“body of literature emphasizing the dialogic and social nature of property law and es-
chewing the . . . static, individualist conception of property rights”). 
16
Id. at 1099-1101. 
17
Id. at 1101. 
18
Id. 
19
Id. at 1102-03 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
20
Id. at 1102 (defining acquisitive lawbreaking as “involv[ing] actions that are ori-
ented primarily toward direct appropriation”). 
2008] RULE OF (OUT)LAW 335 
lunch counters in August 1960,
21
 did not trespass in order to appro-
priate the lunch counters in which they sat.  In fact, even if the sit-in 
participants would have been allowed to eat at the lunch counters 
where they were sitting, their goals would not have been met without 
the passage of general prohibitions against segregated lunch count-
ers.
22
  Intersectional outlaws break property laws for motives that are 
both acquisitive and expressive.  As Professors Peñalver and Katyal de-
scribe, the urban squatters of the 1970s were motivated not only by 
their desire to protest the government’s failure to convert publicly 
owned, abandoned property into much-needed low-income housing, 
but also by their desire to own the dilapidated building in which they 
had squatted but which they could not afford to purchase.
23
 
Each of the acquisitive, expressive, and intersectional outlaws 
highlighted by Professors Peñalver and Katyal has engineered social 
change.  The outlaw’s socially productive role in property law is dif-
ferent from her role in other areas of law.  In property law, “outlaws 
are able to offer us a concrete vision of their alternative conception of 
the law.  The property outlaw therefore provides the official decision 
maker with actual, rather than hypothetical, circumstances under 
which to evaluate the degree of her commitment to the status quo.”
24
  
Moreover, “American property law is full of doctrines whose principal 
purpose appears to be the hindrance of nonconsensual alterations in 
existing property allocations and entitlements.”
25
  In light of the ten-
sion between stagnant property law doctrines and the positive social 
changes that property outlaws have historically engineered, Peñalver 
and Katyal argue that property law “should be careful not to protect 
property rights in such a way as to preclude outlaws from productively 
violating existing official legal norms.”
26
  Thus, property law should 
“retain a certain flexibility”
27
 when dealing with property outlaws. 
 
21
See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963) (holding that con-
victing black students for failing to leave a restaurant’s whites-only lunch counter vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
22
See Peñalver and Katyal, supra note 3, at 1115 (“[S]it-ins were aimed at achieving 
broad legal transformation of the social meaning of public accommodation, one that 
would permanently rearrange the property rights of all owners . . . .”). 
23
See id. at 1123-26 (explaining that city governments would either auction pub-
licly owned properties to the highest bidder, or else hold them in their dilapidated 
states, despite strong local demands for low-income housing). 
24
Id. at 1139. 
25
Id. at 1134. 
26
Id. at 1130; see also id. at 1164 (where the authors express “concern[] that, in its 
strategies of punishment, the law may aim to preclude too much property lawbreak-
ing”). 
27
Id. at 1141. 
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Because of the productive role of property outlaws, Peñalver and 
Katyal propose to “legaliz[e] certain categories of forced transfers, 
temporarily or permanently.”
28
  The counter-intuition that lawbreak-
ing can actually promote rulemaking is overwhelmed by Peñalver and 
Katyal’s strong case that “creating a formalized process by which [out-
laws] can accomplish the goal of ownership[]is ultimately an order-
enhancing, not an order-destroying, strategy.”
29
 
Their proposals center on expanding existing tools within prop-
erty law so that sanctions in certain contexts can be reconfigured in 
proportion to the productive value of certain outlaw behavior.  For 
example, they propose shortening the timeframe during which a tres-
passer can gain title to a tract of land through adverse possession,
30
 
and requiring courts to treat economic necessity in the same way they 
treat necessity caused by natural disaster.
31
 
III.  PROPERTY OUTLAWS AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
In identifying property outlaws as positive agents of social change, 
Peñalver and Katyal explore an important and fascinating phenome-
non.  Moreover, the authors convincingly reconstruct the history of 
our nation’s most infamous property lawbreakers in arguing for the 
incorporation of selective outlaw behavior into the stubborn and so-
cially unreflective institution of property law.  Their work is illuminat-
ing, and its effects on the theory and practice of property law are sure 
to be profound and innumerable.  This Response highlights in par-
ticular how the authors’ ideas impact the nature of the right to ex-
clude in relation to its fellow sticks in the bundle of property rights. 
A.  The Connection Between Outlaws and the Right To Exclude 
Each of Peñalver and Katyal’s outlaws is motivated differently, but 
all of them violate, and have violated, property law in socially produc-
tive ways.  The acquisitive adverse possessor, the expressive sit-in par-
ticipant, and the intersectional urban squatter have each broken 
 
28
Id. at 1150. 
29
Id. at 1151. 
30
See id. at 1171 (arguing that adverse possession requirements, like the customary 
seven-year notice requirement, are outdated considering that modern advances have 
made property monitoring much easier). 
31
See id. at 1173-74 (“In a predominantly market-based economy that relies almost 
exclusively upon consensual transactions to get property from one person to another, 
economic necessity can be as dire an evil as catastrophic flooding.”). 
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property laws.  More specifically, these outlaws have each invaded an 
owner’s right to exclude.
32
  For the overwhelming number of sub-
scribers to property law’s axiomatic bundle-of-rights theory,
33
 as well as 
those who favor the “sovereignty thesis,”
34
 which elevates in impor-
tance the right to exclude above other sticks in the bundle, this shared 
characteristic may have profound implications for the fundamental 
conception of property law. 
B.  Anything, but Not “That”:  The Problem with Situating the Right To 
Exclude in the Bundle 
Even the staunchest proponents of property law’s sovereignty the-
sis concede that the right to exclude does admit exceptions.  Cases 
where courts have awarded damages or issued injunctions on the basis 
of an owner’s right to exclude must be reconciled with equal and op-
posite reactive cases where courts have not.  What becomes difficult 
about admitting exceptions to the right to exclude is explaining—
despite those exceptions—the right’s status as property law’s most im-
portant or defining right.  And, as preeminent property scholars have 
noted recently, 
As always when one has a basic rule (the right to exclude) subject to ex-
ceptions, there is a question whether the exceptions should be stated in 
a rule-like fashion, or whether the whole issue (right to exclude or not to 
exclude) should be resolved in a case-by-case fashion with more atten-
tion to the balance of interests in each case.35 
 
32
As opposed to, for example, invading an owner’s right to use her property by 
creating a nuisance.  Professor Lee Anne Fennell has observed that property outlaws 
who violate an owner’s power to veto a transaction most effectively perform the infor-
mation-generating function for which property outlaws’ behavior is valuable.  See Lee 
Anne Fennell, Response, Order with Outlaws?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 269, 273 
(2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Fennell.pdf (“There is 
something special about an owner’s ability to block a transaction, and hence some-
thing noteworthy about lawbreaking that is narrowly focused on removing a block-
ade.”); id. at 275 (“A focus on blockades also offers a way to distinguish veto-
challenging property violations . . . from violations that assert veto powers in areas 
where access has been legally mandated . . . .”). 
33
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2007) (calling the bundle-of-sticks conception of property a “famil-
iar metaphor”). 
34
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
393 (Foundation Press 2007); see also Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 COR-
NELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) (“[T]he essence of private property is always the right to ex-
clude others.”). 
35
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 34, at 439. 
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The right to exclude is, of course, riddled with exceptions. In this way 
it is no different from many rules.  However, much as Meat Loaf’s 
statement that he “wo[uld]n’t do that” would not have mystified lis-
teners had he not said earlier that he “would do anything for love,”
36
 
the right to exclude’s exceptions may not have caused such a stir in 
the property literature had it not been touted in the courts and on the 
pages of law journals as property’s number one right. 
Property casebooks often cover the right to exclude by discussing 
two conflicting seminal cases, Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.
37
 and State 
v. Shack.
38
  In Jacque, defendant Steenberg Homes wanted to deliver a 
mobile home via the easiest route, which happened to lie across Har-
vey and Lois Jacque’s snow-covered field.  The Jacques were “an eld-
erly couple . . . [who] were sensitive about allowing others on their 
land because they had lost property valued at over $10,000 to other 
neighbors in an adverse possession action in the mid-1980’s.”
39
  As a 
result of their sensitivity, the Jacques repeatedly refused Steenberg 
Homes’s requests to move the home across their farm field.  Even of-
fers to pay the Jacques in exchange for the right to move the home 
across their land were refused.
40
  Steenberg Homes’s employees ulti-
mately ignored these refusals, and carried the home using a bobcat 
through the Jacques’ snow-covered field to their neighbor’s lot.
41
  
Though no damages could be calculated as a result of Steenberg 
Homes’s intentional trespass, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held 
that “in certain situations of trespass, the actual harm is not in the 
damage done to the land, which may be minimal, but in the loss of 
the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her property.”
42
 
In short, the Jacque court concluded that intentional trespass 
causes an inherent harm to landowners, and that by failing to award 
punitive damages to the Jacques, the court would “send[] the wrong 
message to Steenberg Homes and any others who contemplate tres-
passing on the land of another.”
43
  Steenberg Homes’s conduct was, in 
the eyes of the Jacque court, “egregious”
44
—despite the absence of any 
 
36
MEAT LOAF, supra note 1. 
37
563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
38
277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
39
563 N.W.2d at 156-57. 
40
Id. at 157. 
41
Id. 
42
Id. at 159. 
43
Id. at 161. 
44
Id. at 164. 
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actual harm to the Jacques’ land—because intentionally trespassing 
on someone else’s land violates “one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property,”
45
 
namely the right to exclude. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey decided State v. Shack very dif-
ferently.  In Shack, the court considered an owner’s right to exclude a 
health service provider and a lawyer who wished to enter a camp on 
the owner’s property where migrant workers lived and worked.
46
  In 
deciding that “defendants . . . invaded no possessory right of the 
farmer-employer” and that “[t]heir conduct was therefore beyond the 
reach of the trespass statute,”
47
 the Shack court held in a larger sense 
that 
[a] man’s right in his real property of course is not absolute.  It was a 
maxim of the common law that one should so use his property as not to 
injure the rights of others.  Although hardly a precise solvent of actual 
controversies, the maxim does express the inevitable proposition that 
rights are relative and there must be an accommodation when they 
meet.  Hence it has long been true that necessity, private or public, may 
justify entry upon the lands of another.
48
 
In light of the relativity of property rights, the Shack court weighed the 
interests of the migrant workers who lived on the landowner’s farm 
against the landowner’s right to exclude individuals who could help 
them.  Because “[p]roperty rights serve human values,”
49
 the land-
owner’s property rights did not “include dominion over the destiny of 
persons [he] permit[ted] to come upon the premises.  Their well-
being must remain the paramount concern of a system of law.”
50
 
What emerges from a comparison of Jacque, Shack, and a number 
of other cases that have demonstrated exceptions to the right to ex-
clude
51
 is that the right to exclude is absolute, except when it is not.
52
  
 
45
Id. at 159-60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994)). 
46
277 A.2d 369, 370 (N.J. 1971). 
47
Id. at 375. 
48
Id. at 373 (citations omitted). 
49
Id. at 372. 
50
Id. 
51
See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84, 88 (1980) (holding 
that a requirement by the California State Constitution that owners of a shopping mall 
permit pamphleteers to petition on shopping center property did not infringe on the 
owner’s right to exclude); Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 371-72 (N.J. 
1982) (holding that a casino, by opening its doors to the general public, loses its right 
to selectively exclude card counters); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188,  188-89 (Vt. 1908) 
(holding that a ship owner could sue the owner of the dock to which the ship owner 
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Of course, a rule that admits exceptions is not unusual, whether in 
property or another area of law.  However, two principal factors make 
exceptions to the right to exclude stranger than other exceptions.  
First, the hyperbolic characterization of the importance of the right to 
exclude in cases like Jacque, Kaiser Aetna, and Loretto,
53
 where courts 
have privileged it over a competing interest, seems not to contemplate 
anything but an absolute right. 
Second, the right to exclude’s exceptions involve cases in which a 
property right (e.g., an owner’s right to exclude) is weighed against a 
non-property right (e.g., the right to the preservation of life during a 
natural disaster as in Ploof, or the right to free speech as in Prune-
Yard
54
).  One might attribute this phenomenon to the fact that, in 
general, non-property rights trump property rights.  However, this ap-
proach to the right to exclude’s exceptions is problematic for at least 
two reasons.  First, to say that the law often cares more about protect-
ing people than it does about protecting property is both overly sim-
ple and inaccurate.  While at one point the purpose of criminal laws 
aimed at protecting property rights was to “defend[] society against 
[a] breach of the peace, rather than protect[] individual property 
rights,”
55
 that purpose has evolved over time toward the general pro-
tection of property rights.
56
  Second, even if it was true that the law, as 
a general matter, favored non-property rights over property rights, 
what remains unexplained is why the right to exclude, in particular 
 
moored his ship during a storm, and from which the dock owner unmoored the ship, 
causing the ship to be driven onto the shore and the people and cargo on it to be 
tossed into the water). 
52
See Laura S. Underkuffler, Response, Lessons from Outlaws, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 262, 267 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/ 
Underkuffler.pdf (“The underlying problem that theorists and others face is that 
property embodies a deep and inherent paradox.  On the one hand, property by its very 
nature embodies conscious, brutal, distributive decisions. . . . And yet—and here is the 
paradox—protection is also the essence of property.”). 
53
See cases cited supra note 9. 
 
54
See supra note 51. 
55
See People v. Olivo, 420 N.E.2d 40, 42 (N.Y. 1981) (explaining the historical de-
velopment of the crime of larceny). 
56
See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 519-
20 (1976) (contending that this evolution was part of a process of “classifying all crimes 
as intrusions against specific socially protected interests”); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, 
Response, Property In-Laws, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 279, 287 (2007), http:// 
www.pennumbra.com/responses/12-2007/Garnett.pdf (“It may be the case that most 
trespasses are relatively minor offenses . . . . But, all the same, . . . most wars are fought 
over territory.  Property does matter, as centuries of battles, large and small, to defend 
it show.”). 
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(as opposed to the other property rights in the bundle), is excepted in 
this way. 
Admitting exceptions to the right to exclude is uncomfortable.  
The exaggerated rhetoric of its prominence by Blackstone, and in 
cases like Jacque, complicate an understanding of how the right to ex-
clude maintains its dual identity—being at once absolute and non-
absolute. 
C.  Understanding Exclusion by Way of the Outlaw 
Reconciling exclusion’s centrality with its exceptions has led some 
to explain that an owner has the right to exclude individuals from her 
property not as a rule, but instead as a standard.
57
  Rules decide mat-
ters ex ante, while standards decide matters ex post.  Rules have been 
argued to be more costly to create but cheaper to apply than stan-
dards.
58
   
Shack seems to invoke a standard something like this:  If a stranger 
crosses the boundary of an owner’s property, then the owner can have 
the stranger evicted—provided the owner’s interest in protecting his 
autonomy is sufficiently great and the interests of other persons in abro-
gating the owner’s right to exclude are not more important.
59
 
Professor Joseph Singer has further developed the contours of 
that standard by arguing that “non-owners have a right of access to 
property based on need or on some other important public policy.”
60
  
Singer believes that “owners have no right to exclude non-owners 
from their property when access to that property is necessary to pre-
vent serious harm to them or to others.”
61
  He argues that property 
law’s “reliance interest”—essentially, the idea that property rights 
serve human values
62
—was at work in Shack, Uston, and PruneYard.  
There, the courts “created a public policy exception to the right to 
 
57
See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 34, at 405 (“One important difference between 
Shack and decisions such as Jacque is that the court implicitly treats the owner’s right to 
exclude not as a rule but as a standard.”). 
58
See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
608-17 (1992) (comparing the effort and time required to create and apply standards 
versus rules). 
59
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 34, at 406. 
60
Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 675 
(1988). 
61
Id. 
62
See id. at 751 (“Property rights allocate power . . . . Those without power are vul-
nerable.  Thus the relation between power and vulnerability should be at the heart of 
our analysis of property rights.”). 
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exclude under [the] trespass doctrine”
63
 because, in exceptional cases, 
“property rights are shared or shifted to non-owners when [non-
owners] have relied on relationships of mutual dependence that made 
access to such property available in the past.”
64
 
While some of those past relationships emanated from agree-
ments between owners and non-owners where owners expressly per-
mitted non-owners access to the owners’ properties, some of them did 
not.  Of those relationships that did not, like the relationship between 
the health services provider, lawyer, and farm-owner in Shack, the op-
erative question is why, despite the centrality of the right to exclude in 
some cases, non-owners without express agreements with owners 
would rely on access to owners’ land. 
Current efforts to understand the right to exclude focus on the 
right’s exceptions.  Unfortunately, a theory aimed at unifying excep-
tions to the right to exclude offers little insight into the peculiar na-
ture of the right itself.  After analyzing its exceptions, the most that we 
know is that some interests are not so important, some are really im-
portant, and if a non-owner has an interest of the latter sort, she has 
the right to access an owner’s land.  We do not know, however, why 
some interests weigh more than others when balanced against the 
right to exclude, the constant variable. 
By shifting focus from the right’s exceptions to the right itself, we 
may understand more about both the exceptions and the right.  Each 
of Peñalver and Katyal’s outlaws presents an opportunity to under-
stand these important aspects of property law.
65
  Each outlaw has vio-
lated an owner’s right to exclude.
66
  Notably, each outlaw has violated 
an owner’s right to exclude when the owner invoked no other right in 
the property bundle as justification for her complaint.  For example, 
acquisitive outlaws, like the adverse possessor, “win”
67
 against the 
owner who does not, within the statutory period, use, possess, or trans-
fer his property.  Intersectional outlaws, like the urban squatter, won 
access to the dilapidated buildings in which they squatted against the 
city-owners who did not use, possess, or transfer them. 
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Id. at 676. 
64
Id. at 678. 
65
See Fennell, supra note 32, at 278 (“The work of refining property law to strike 
the right balance between access and exclusion is always ongoing, and Peñalver and 
Katyal skillfully show us that outlaws can offer useful, if unconventional, guidance.”). 
66
See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
67
I use the term “win” to refer to property law’s determination that a non-owner 
has the right to violate the property rights of an owner. 
2008] RULE OF (OUT)LAW 343 
The acquisitive outlaw who seeks access to an owner’s property for 
purposes of necessity and the expressive outlaw are both slightly more 
complicated.  Each of them wins access to an owner’s property,
68
 but 
each has violated an owner’s right to exclude while the owner was, in 
fact, using, possessing, or transferring his property.  However, in each 
of these cases the owner’s exclusion was not related to its use, posses-
sion, or transfer of his property.  Of course, the owners in each of 
these cases could have argued that their need to exclude, for example, 
black students from sitting at their lunch counters or ship owners 
from mooring ships to their docks, infringed on their use, possession, 
or ability to transfer their property.  Under the current conception of 
the right to exclude, whose violation in Jacque caused inherent harm, 
owners would not need to so argue.
69
 
Thus, through property law’s outlaw, the right to exclude is un-
derstood as the right that protects owner from non-owner.  However, 
the outlaw tells us that an owner cannot invoke such an important 
right if he wishes to invoke it in isolation.  The message is an impor-
tant one—exclusion is central to property, but property is also central 
to exclusion.  The right to exclude is ultimately the most important of 
the sticks in the property bundle.  However, to invoke such an impor-
tant right, an owner must demonstrate his commitment to property by 
excluding while, or for the purpose of, using the bundle’s other sticks. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to exclude is not only one of the most important rights 
in the property bundle; it is the most puzzling.  Its mysterious dual 
identity has generated a need within the legal community for explana-
tions.  This Response has sought to provide an explanation of the 
right to exclude that embraces its duality.  I have argued that the right 
is absolute, so long as its exercise is coupled with the exercise of an-
other right in the property bundle. 
The theory’s honesty—its respect for the right’s simultaneous ab-
soluteness as well as its exceptions—promotes a clearer understanding 
of the right to exclude, as well as its neighboring sticks.  Property out-
laws demonstrate that the right to exclude allows an owner to do any-
thing to protect her property, even though it does not allow her to . . . 
do that. 
 
68
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
69
Of course, in the case of the lunch counter owner, a plea to exclude blacks 
would be denied today even if backed by a property-related reason. 
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